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REPLY ARGUMENT AND CITATION TO AUTHORITY 
I. An Owner of Property may become Vicariously Liable for 
the Actions of its General Contractor. 
Appellee CPB possessed the contractual right and power, 
(and exercised same), to accept or reject any subcontractor or 
employee selected by Appellee Hales and Warner. In doing so, CPB 
became liable under Utah law for the negligence of Hales & 
Warner and the death of Jason Smith. 
CPB argues (1) under Utah law, a Property owner's 
possession of the right to accept or reject any subcontractor or 
employee does not, on its own, subject the Property owner to 
liability for the negligent acts of its statutory employees; and 
(2), even if possession of such a right to choose employees of 
subcontractors or general contractors on its own does subject a 
Property owner to liability, CPB argues that it never possessed 
such a right in the first place. Appellee CPB is wrong on both 
elements. 
Ludlow v. Industrial Commission, 65 UT 168, 179, 235 P. 
884, 888 (Utah 1925) and Lodge v. Industrial Commission, 562 
P.2d 227, 228 (Utah 1977) both hold that u(a)n independent 
contractor can employ others to do the work and accomplish 
the contemplated result without the consent of the 
2 
contractee, while an employee cannot substitute another in 
his place without the consent of the employer../' Appellee 
CPB criticizes these cases based on their age. Of course, 
while the age of a case should be considered in assessing 
its precedential value, the longer a case withstands the 
test of time, the more solid its precedential value. See 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 2 L. Ed. 60, 1 Cranch 137 
(1803) (200 years old and equally authoritative today as it 
was the day it was issued). Likewise, Ludlow and Lodge 
remain good law and have never been overturned. In fact, Utah 
Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Manning, 1999 UT 77, 114, 985 P.2d 
243, 247, cites Ludlow and its exact same above-quoted 
language in order to find that a general contractor was the 
actual employer of its subcontractor—just as in present 
case. Central to the decision reached in Utah Home Fire 
Ins. Co. was the fact that the subcontractor needed to 
obtain the approval of the general contractor with respect 
to each worker the subcontractor hired: 
"Holmes & Narver (the general contractor) also required 
that Green (the subcontractor) obtain its approval with 
respect to each worker Green employed. In fact, on one 
occasion, Holmes & Narver prevented Green from hiring a 
particular individual." 
Id. at 114, 247. 
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Further, and being entirely consistent with Utah's legal 
history, in Osman Home Improvement v. Industrial Comm'n, 342 
Utah Adv. Rep. 7, ^10-11, 958 P.2d 240, 244 (Utah App. 
1998), this Court once again said "that the difference 
between an employee and an independent contractor is: (a)n 
independent contractor can employ others to do the work and 
accomplish the contemplated result without the consent of 
the contractee, while an employee cannot substitute another 
in his place without the consent of the employer. Osman 
Home Improvement then applied such law to find that a 
General Roofing contractor was liable for the injuries of 
its subcontractor's employees because the General 
Contractor retained the authority to fire roofers, and to 
require roofers to obtain its permission before hiring any 
assistants. Id. 
Aside from the recent cases cited above, the law of 
Utah remains as it always has: a Property Owner or General 
Contractor is an employer of its purported independent 
contractors and their employees, if the latter cannot 
substitute another in his place without the consent of the 
former. A long history exists for this precedent. See 
Chatelain v. Thackeray, 98 Utah 525, 100 P.2d 191 (Utah 
4 
1940) , Luker Sand & Gravel Co, v. Industrial Comm'n, 82 
Utah 188, 23 P.2d 225 (Utah 1933). Appellee CPB's argument 
ignores eight decades of Utah Supreme Court precedent and 
seeks to impose an alternative analysis. 
Appellants' acknowledge that Appellee CPB's cited case 
Glover v. Boy Scouts of America, 299 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 55-6, 
923 P. 2d 1383, 1385, (Utah 1996) establishes whether an 
employer-employee relationship existed between the parties 
depends on whether the alleged employer had the right to 
control the employee. The "right to control the employee" 
is determined in Glover by analyzing several factors which 
include: 
1. (W)hatever covenants or agreements exist concerning 
the right of direction and control over the employee; 
2. the right to hire and fire; 
3. the method of payment (i.e., wages versus payment for 
a completed job or project); and 
4 . the furnishing of equipment. 
The court states that the intent of the parties and the 
business of the employer may be considered, in addition 
to compensation, direction, and control and that no 
single factor is completely controlling. However, the 
court has consistently held that whether an employer-
employee relationship exists depends upon the 
employerfs right to control the employee. 
Id. at 1385-1386. 
Appellee fails to address the legal holdings of the six 
above-cited cases in their brief or how they remain good 
5 
law despite Glover. Nonetheless, this Court must reconcile 
Glover with the Supreme Court Cases cited above. 
In this case, Glover stands for the proposition that when 
CPB met the factors outlined above, then they retained control 
over their employees Hales and Warner, Brent Reynolds and Egbert 
Construction and became liable for Jason Smith's death. However, 
Ludlow, supra stands for the proposition that even if the other 
factors of Glover were somehow not met, (Appellant argues below 
that they were satisfied), CPB still became the employer of 
Hales & Warner, when they retained and exercised the right to 
reject any of the subcontractors or employees Hales & Warner 
might have wished to substitute in its place. This is because 
no employee may substitute another in its place without the 
consent of its employer. See Ludlow, supra. 
Both Ludlow, supra, and Glover, can be reconciled if 
Ludlow, supra, is interpreted to demonstrate, as it expressly 
says, that the right to hire and fire is the sine qua non of an 
independent contractor. Without that power, the sine qua non, an 
entity cannot be an independent contractor. With that authority, 
an entity might be an independent contractor, or might not. The 
Glover factors must be analy2!;ed to make that determination. 
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The situation in Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., supra (a 
post-Glover Utah Supreme Court case), bears a striking 
resemblance to the issue presented to the Court by the case 
at bar. In Utah Home Fire Ins. Co. case, the general 
contractor held the right to refuse its subcontractor from 
hiring employees or other subcontractors. The same was true 
in Qsman Home Improvement, supra. In the case at bar, 
Appellee CPB admits that "CPB retained the right to refuse 
to allow a subcontractor to do work on the project." 
Appellee's brief at 35. CPB's contract provides as 
follows: 
B. The Contractor shall not contract with any 
Subcontractor who has been rejected by the Owner. 
The Contractor will not be required to contract with 
any Subcontractor against whom it has a reasonable 
objection1. 
C. If the Owner refuses to accept any Subcontractor 
proposed by the Contractor, the Contractor shall 
propose an acceptable substitute to whom the Owner 
has no reasonable objection. 
D. The Contractor shall not make any substitution for 
any Subcontractor which has been accepted by the 
Owner and the Architect without the prior written 
approval of the Owner and the Architect2. 
See Brief of Appellant, Exhibit 2, Section 5, 5.1 (B-
D). Footnote comments and bold added. 
1
 In the converse, CPB clearly requires here that Hales & Warner, et. al. 
shall work with any subcontractors that CPB chooses so long as Hales & Warner 
does not have a reasonable objection. 
2
 This language is identical to the critical language from Ludlow supra. See, 
Qsman Home Improvement v. Industrial Comm'n, 342 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 1 10-11, 
958 P.2d 240, 244 (Utah App. 1998). 
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Comparing Section 5.1 (D) of the contract in this case, 
to the language of Osman Home Improvement, demonstrates 
that Hales & Warner was clearly an employee, not an 
independent contractor, of Appellee CPB: 
An independent contractor can employ others to do the 
work and accomplish the contemplated result without the 
consent of the contractee, while an employee cannot 
substitute another in his place without the consent of 
the employer. 
Osman Home Improvement v. Industrial Commfn,342 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 7, 1J10-11, 958~ p- 2 d 240, 244 (Utah App. 
1998)(emphasis supplied). 
As an employer, CPB became vicariously liable for the 
negligent actions of its general contractor, Hales & Warner. 
II. Appellee CPB is Liable for Work-place Injuries to 
Employees of Sub-Subcontractors Because CPB is an Owner 
of Real Property who Contracts with a Contractor to 
Construct a Building on the Owner's Property. 
There are at least two circumstances in which an owner 
of property, like CPB, may become liable for the injuries 
of subcontractor employees., Under the first circumstance, 
CPB may become liable for Jason Smith's death if they 
retained control over the work of their general contractor. 
See Thompson v. Jess, 1999 Utah 22, 979 P.2d 322 (Utah 1999). 
Under the second circumstance, CPB would become liable 
8 
because Utah Law imposes a duty on a possessor of land 
(CPB) to warn an invitee (Jason Smith) about two general 
types of hazards: (1) those that are present on the land 
when the invitee enters which the possessor should expect 
the invitee will not discover or realize; and (2) those 
that the possessor creates after the invitee's entry; and 
that the possessor of land (CPB) breached that duty. See 
Hale v. Beckstead, 2003 UT App 240, 74 P.3d 628 (2003). 
1. CPB is liable for Jason Smith's Death Because CPB 
"Retained Control" (The First Circumstance). 
In Utah, employees covered by Worker's Compensation, 
like Jason Smith, can sue third parties, like CPB, for 
their negligence. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106 states that 
injuries or deaths caused by wrongful acts or neglect of 
persons other than employer, officer, agent, or employee of 
employer; may entitle the injured or family of the deceased 
to maintain an action for damages against the third person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106 (4) specifically provides that 
such an action may be maintained against the following 
persons who do not occupy an employee-employer relationship 
with the injured or deceased employee at the time of the 
injury or death: a subcontractor, a general contractor, an 
9 
independent contractor, a property owner, or a lessee or 
assignee of a property owner. CPB is a property owner. 
For example, Utah Code Ann. § 34a-2-106 would have 
allowed an injured employee-plaintiff of a general 
contractor to bring a civil action for negligence against a 
defendant subcontractor, because the subcontractor was 
considered a third party subject to suit by the statute. 
Shupe v. Wasatch Electric, Co., 546 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 
1976). Nonemployers may be sued for common law damages for 
injuries to workers caused by the negligence of the 
nonemployer, Ghersi v. Salazar, 251 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 883 
P.2d 1352, 1355 (Utah 1994). The Supreme Court has held 
that an injured subcontractor employee could sue the 
general contractor for the general contractor's negligence. 
Riddle v, Mays, 118 Utah Adv. Rep. 45, 780 P.2d 1252 (Utah 
1989). In Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 110 Utah Adv. Rep. 
3, 777 P. 2d 428 (Utah 1989)3, the Court ruled that under 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62 [now renumbered as § 34a-2-106] a 
worker can recover against those persons who might be his 
or her statutory employers under § 35-1-42 [renumbered as § 
In Pate, an injured plaintiff-employee of a sub contractor to a sub 
contractor was allowed to sue the defendant general contractor and the 
general's subcontractor (the one that employed plaintiff's subcontractor) for 
negligence. 
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34a-2-103]. The Pate Court concluded that "the legislature 
has in clear and unmistakable language evinced an intention 
to allow suits by an injured worker against those persons 
who might be his or her statutory employer as defined in § 
35-1-42 [renumbered as 34a-2-103]4. Pate at 431. Only the 
immediate, or common law, employer, who actually pays 
compensation, and its officers, agents, and employees are 
shielded by the exclusive remedy immunity conferred by Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-60 [renumbered as § 34a-2-105]. Id. 
In a case similar to the case at bar, the Supreme Court 
found that where an injured employee plaintiff was employed 
by a subcontractor who provided Worker's Compensation 
benefits to that plaintiff, the plaintiff was still allowed 
to bring a claim for negligence against the defendant 
general contractor because they had not been required to 
pay plaintiff's workers' compensation benefits and that the 
latter does not partake of the immunity afforded by Section 
35-1-60 [renumbered as 34a-2-105]. Bosch v. Busch,110 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 6, 777 P.2d 431, 432 (Utah 1989). 
4
 Furthermore, the 10th Circuit also holds that as a result of the 1974 
amendments to Utah's Worker's Compensation Act, the Utah legislature has in 
clear and unmistakable language evinced an intention to allow suites by an 
injured worker against persons who might be his or her statutory employer as 
defined in § 35-1-42 [renumbered as § 34a-2-103]. Goheen v. Yellow Freight 
Sytems, 32 F.3d 1450, 1453 (10th Cir, 1994). 
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The policy behind this law is that the state worker's 
compensation act should no longer be construed to provide 
tort immunity to statutory employers who have not been 
required to pay benefits thereunder to the injured worker. 
Lamb v. W-Energy, Inc., 884 F.2d 1349, 1349 (10th Cir. 
1989). Utah's exclusive remedy provisions in the Worker's 
Compensation Act did not extend to statutory employers who 
had not in fact been required to pay workers' compensation 
benefits to an injured plaintiff-employee. Snyder v. 
Celsius Energy Co., 866 F. Supp. 1349, 1361 (D. Utah 1994) . 
Thus, a property owner like CPB5 may be liable once 
Appellants establish CPB's negligence. 
Nonetheless, Utah adheres to the general common law 
rule that the employer of an independent contractor is not 
liable for physical harm caused to another by an act or 
omission of the contractor or his servants. Thompson v. Jess, 
1999 Utah 22, |13, 979 P.2d 322, 325 (Utah 1999). The scope and 
limits of Thompson was briefed and argued extensively in 
Appellants primary brief, and Appellants endeavor not to restate 
those arguments. However, Appellants briefly address the issues 
raised in Appellee CPB's brief and response argues as follows: 
5CPB did not pay Jason Smith's worker's compensation benefits. 
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The general rule of Thompson recognizes that one who 
hires an independent contractor and does not participate in 
or control the manner in which the contractor's work is 
performed owes no duty of care concerning the safety of the 
manner or method of performance implemented. Id. However, 
the owner of property will be liable if they retained 
control. The retained control doctrine is a narrow theory 
of liability, applicable in the unique circumstance where 
an employer of an independent contractor exercises enough 
control over the contracted work to give rise to a limited 
duty of care, but not enough to become an employer or a 
master of those over whom the control is asserted. Id. at 
515, 326. There was a genuine issue of material fact with 
regard to whether the Appellee CPB could be liable under 
Thompson theory. 
In addition, if CPB, as a land owner, retained control 
over their general contractors, and failed to take 
reasonable care to protect its contractor's employees, then 
CPB can be held liable. The Worker's Compensation Act will 
not act as a bar to recovery by Plaintiff. 
Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 413 (1965), one 
who employs an independent contractor to do work which the 
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employer should recognize as likely to create, during its 
progress, a peculiar or unreasonable risk of physical harm 
to others unless special precautions are taken, is subject 
to liability for physical harm caused to them by the 
absence of such precautions if the employer (a) fails to 
provide in the contract that the contractor shall take such 
precautions, or (b) fails to exercise reasonable care to 
provide in some other manner for the taking of such 
precautions. Thompson, at 1(252, 328. There is a genuine 
issue of material fact with regard to whether the Appellee 
CPB could be liable under § 413, and the trial court erred 
in dismissing the Plaintiffs' case. 
Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 416 (1965), one 
who employs an independent contractor to do work which the 
employer should recognize as likely to create during its 
progress a peculiar risk of physical harm to others unless 
special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for 
physical harm caused to them by the failure of the 
contractor to exercise reasonable care to take such 
precautions, even though the employer has provided for such 
precautions in the contract or otherwise. Thompson, at 1(2 9, 
329. There is a genuine issue of material fact with regard 
14 
to whether the Appellee CPB could be liable under § 416, 
and the trial court erred in dismissing the Plaintiffs' 
case. 
Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 427 (1965), one 
who employs an independent contractor to do work involving 
a special danger to others which the employer knows or has 
reason to know to be inherent in or normal to the work, or 
which he contemplates or has reason to contemplate when 
making the contract, is subject to liability for physical 
harm caused to such others by the contractor's failure to 
take reasonable precautions against such danger. Thompson, 
at 129, 329. Again, there is a genuine issue of material 
fact with regard to whether the Appellee CPB could be 
liable under § 427, and the trial court erred in dismissing 
the Plaintiffs' case. 
From Thompson, we know that if CPB retained control 
over any part of the work, then they subjected themselves 
to liability for Jason Smith's death when they failed to 
exercise their control with reasonable care. But, we also 
know that CPB will not be liable for Jason Smith's death 
unless CPB actively participated in the performance of the 
work. Thompson defines active participation as when an 
15 
employer is actively involved in, or asserts control over, 
the manner of performance of the contracted work. Active 
participation occurs, for example, if CPB directs that the 
contracted work be done by use of a certain mode or 
otherwise interferes with the means and methods by which 
the work is to be accomplished. 
Here, CPB retained complete control over its 
contractors through its contract with Hales & Warner. 
Brief of Appellants, pages 39-44, (identifying facts). 
Hales & Warner could not even substitute another contractor 
in its place without CPB's permission. Brief of Appellants, 
page 41, (identifying facts in paragraphs h, i, and j). 
CPB actively participated in the work done by leaving for 
itself several of the intricate, detail jobs to be done by 
CPB on its own. Brief of Appellants, page 42, at paragraph 
1. CPB also interfered in the framing process (the same 
process in which Jason Smith died) by dictating how high 
specific framed walls would be and what the specific 
methods for framing were. Brief of Appellants, page 13, at 
paragraph m. Finally, once CPB retained control, they 
failed to exercise their powers and authority in a 
reasonable way, because they did absolutely nothing to stop 
16 
the unsafe work conditions that led to Jason Smith's death. 
Brief of Appellees, page 9, at paragraph 23. CPB knew of 
these unsafe work conditions that killed Jason Smith, 
because CPB received daily reports. Brief of Appellants, 
page 14, at paragraph o. 
2. CPB is Liabile Because it Failed to Warn its 
Invitee, Jason Smith, (The Second Circumstance). 
"...Thompson contains no analysis with regard to the duty 
owed by a possessor of land to an invitee." Hale v. 
Beckstead, 2003 UT App 240, note 2, 74 P.3d 628 (2003). A 
duty is imposed on a possessor of land to warn an invitee 
about two general types of hazards: (1) those that are 
present on the land when the invitee enters which the 
possessor should expect the invitee will not discover or 
realize; and (2) those that the possessor creates after the 
invitee's entry. Id. at 19, 630. 
The open and obvious danger rule remains viable in Utah 
law governing a homeowner's duty to an invitee. Hale, 
supra, at 19, 630. A possessor of land is subject to 
liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a 
condition on the land if, but only if, he: (1) knows or by 
the exercise of reasonable care would discover the 
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condition, and should realize that it involves an 
unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees; (2) should 
expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, 
or will fail to protect themselves against it; and (3) 
fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against 
danger. Id. at Hl2, 631. A possessor of land is not liable 
to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by any 
activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or 
obvious to them. Id. at Hl3, 631. 
Ther€> are significant exceptions to the open and 
obvious danger rule which can, in some cases, limit the 
protection the rule affords to landowners. Hale, supra, at 
1115, 631-632. A possessor of land is not liable to his 
invitee for physical harm caused to them by any activity or 
condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to 
them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm 
despite such knowledge or obviousness. Id. However, there 
are cases in which the possessor of land can, and should, 
anticipate that a dangerous condition will cause physical 
harm to an invitee notwithstanding its known or obvious 
danger. Id. at P15 and 632. In such cases the possessor is 
not relieved of the duty of reasonable care which he owes 
18 
to the invitee for his protection. Id. Such reason to 
expect harm to the visitor from known or obvious dangers 
may arise, for example, where the possessor has reason to 
expect that the invitee's attention may be distracted6, so 
that he will not discover what is obvious, or will forget 
what he has discovered, or fail to protect himself against 
it. Id. Such reason may also arise where the possessor has 
reason to expect that the invitee will proceed to encounter 
the known or obvious danger because to a reasonable man in 
his position the advantages of doing so would outweigh the 
apparent risk. Id. 
The existence of exceptions to the open and obvious 
danger rule avoids the rigidity of the traditional common-
law rule by permitting the courts to hold that a 
plaintiff's knowledge of a danger does not necessarily 
absolve the occupier of liability, and permits a plaintiff 
to recover if it appears and is found that a risk was one 
which would not be anticipated or appreciated by the 
invitee, or where the landowner can and should anticipate 
that the dangerous condition will cause harm to the invitee 
6
 For example, Jason Smith was distracted on CPB's jobsite because Jason Smith 
was told to work as fast as he could, or risk being fired. Jason was never 
given any training on how to work safely. Brief of Appellants, page 14, at 
paragraph q. 
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notwithstanding its known or obvious danger. Hale, supra, 
at note 3. Hence, the open and obvious danger rule is not 
necessarily a strict all-or-nothing rule. Id. 
From Hale, we know that a duty is imposed on CPB, a 
possessor of land, to warn an invitee, Jason Smith, about 
two general types of hazards: (1) those that are present on 
the land when the invitee enters which the possessor should 
expect the invitee will not discover or realize; and (2) 
those that the possessor creates after the invitee's 
entry. Also from Hale, a possessor of land becomes subject 
to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a 
condition on the land if, he: (1) knows of, or by the 
exercise of reasonable care would discover, the condition, 
and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of 
harm to such invitees; (2) should expect that they will not 
discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect 
themselves against it; and (3) fails to exercise reasonable 
care to protect them against danger. 
CPB is a possessor of land and therefore owes a duty to 
its invitees. In this case, CPB was informed regularly 
through daily reports of the status and condition of its 
jobsite by its statutory employee Hales & Warner. Brief of 
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Appellants, page 14, at paragraph o; page 40, at paragraphs 
d-e. Hales & Warner knew that Egbert Construction was 
hiring untrained, young and inexperienced workers to work 
with dangerous framing walls. Brief of Appellants, page 
12-13, at paragraphs h-1; page 15-16, at paragraph t. 
Hales & Warner knew this because they told their statutory 
employee Egbert Construction to get proper supervision for 
their young and inexperienced workers. Brief of 
Appellants, pages 15-16, at paragraph t. Hales & Warner 
kept CPB informed daily on everything that took place on 
the construction site. Brief of Appellants, page 14, at 
paragraph o. Moreover, Hales & Warner, was CPB's statutory 
employee and CPB's agent on the job site. See Brief of 
Appellants, pages 37-48. Therefore, whatever Hales & Warner 
knew, must also be imputed to CPB, because "under 
longstanding Utah law, the knowledge of an agent concerning 
the business which he is transacting for his principal is 
to be imputed to his principal." Wardley Better Homes & 
Gardens v. Cannon, 2002 UT 99, 516, 61 P.3d 1009, 1014 
(Utah 1999). Even if this Court rejects the notion that 
Hales & Warner is not CPB's statutory employee, CPB held 
constructive and actual knowledge that unsafe, untrained 
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and young workers were working with dangerous framing 
walls. Brief of Appellants, pages 12-16, This was a 
dangerous and hazardous condition occurring on CPB's land 
prior to and during when Jason Smith came on CPB's land. 
From receiving daily reports and being on site, CPB knew 
this when Jason Smith arrived on the job site. Id.; See 
Also Brief of Appellants, page 14, at paragraph o; page 40, 
at paragraphs d-e. Neither CPB, nor Hales & Warner ever 
took any action to prevent the inexperienced and young 
workers from working with the dangerous framing walls. 
Brief of Appellee CPB, page 9, at paragraph 23. Jason 
Smith died as a result. Brief of Appellants, pages 14-15, 
at paragraphs q-r. Because of his inexperience and 
ignorance, the danger to Jason Smith on CPB's land was not 
known or obvious to Jason Smith. Brief of Appellants, page 
14, at paragraph q. However, CPB held the knowledge and the 
power to stop work on the job site in order to ensure the 
safety of the men and women working there. Brief of 
Appellants, page 41, at paragraph i. CPB remains liable for 
Jason Smith's death. 
Thus, there exist two, or more, recognized theories of 
liability, supported by facts in the record, that authorize and 
22 
require Plaintiffs' case to proceed. Under the first theory, CPB 
retained control over its general and sub contractors and 
therefore became responsible for the contractors' negligent acts 
that killed Jason Smith. Under the second theory, CPB knew that 
its contractors were operating an unsafe construction site and 
that those contractors were performing dangerous activities— 
namely using untrained, unsupervised workers to erect inherently 
dangerous framing structures. Despite knowledge of these 
dangerous activities, CPB did nothing, and admits it did 
nothing, to protect Jason Smith once he was invited onto CPB's 
land. Jason Smith died as a proximate result. 
II. Appellee is Liable Because it Retained Control Over the 
Work Both by Contract and by Conduct. 
Appellants argue in the Brief of the Appellants, pages 39-
46, that liability may be imposed by virtue of the contractual 
rights alone, without respect to whether those rights were 
exercised. Appellants note that the additional affirmative acts 
committed by Appellee CPB, as noted above, in addition to the 
terms of the contract, give rise to liability under the retained 
control doctrine 
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III. CONCLUSION 
The district court erred when it granted the Appellees' 
respective motions for summary judgment. Questions of law still 
remain for a Utah jury to decide and this Court should reverse 
the trial court and instruct it to deny the motions and allow 
Appellants' case to proceed for trial on the merits. 
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